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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
RUTH CAFFALL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

8447

VERN CAFF ALL,
Defenda.nt and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this case the plaintiff, Ruth Caffall, on the 6th day
of September, 1945 filed a complaint in the Third Judicial
Court praying for a decree of divorce from the defendant
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Vern Caffall; and on the 22nd day of October, 1945 a decree
of divorce was duly entered, and said decree provided that
the care, custody and control of the two minor children of
plaintiff and defendant be awarded to the plaintiff and
that the defendant be ordered to pay the sum of $25.00
per month alimony and the. sum of $25.00 each for the
support of the two minor children of plaintiff and defendant.
That on the 22nd day of July, 1954 the defendant Vern
Caffall filed in the Clerk's office of Salt Lake County a
petition to set aside the decree of divorce theretofore entered and in said petition alleged : That on the 22nd day
of July, 1936 the plaintiff Ruth Dolar Caffall entered into
a purported marriage ceremony with the defendant Vern
Caffall at Pocatello, Idaho. That at the time the said plaintiff Ruth Dolar Caffall entered into said marriage ceremony
with the defendant she "·as legally married and had no legal
capacity to marry, yet entered into the said marriage ceremony with the defendant Vern Caffall, and that said purported marriage ceremony was from its inception null and
void and of no legal force and effect, and that the decree
of divorce entered in said action by the court on the 22nd
day of October, 19~15 is therefore null and Yoid and without
legal force and effect, and has been null and void from its
inception, and the petition of said defendant prays that
the purported divorce secured in the above entitled court
on the 22nd da~~ of October, 1945 be set aside and declar~d
n 11 II and void ( R. ~~ ) .
That on the 27th day of January, 1955 the defendant
\lern Caffall b~~ his attorney Raymond R. Brady served
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upon the plaintiff certain interrogatories as provided by
~ rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to answer
l under oath the following questions (R. 14) :
:
"A. Did you marry C. B. Bradford at Evanston, Wyoming on the 8th day of October, 1935?
"B. Were you legally married to him on July
20, 1936?
"C. If you were not married to Mr. Bradford
on July 20, 1936, when and where were you divorced
from Mr. Bradford?
"D. If you were not a divorced woman on July
26, 1936, had you previously secured an annulment?
If so, when and where?
"E. Was Mr. Bradford living on July 20, 1936?
If not, when and where did he die?"

:

To the foregoing interrogatories, the plaintiff Ruth
Caffall did on the 2nd day of February, 1955 file her
answer under oath (R. 15) and in answer to interrogatory
"A" Mrs. Caffall stated, "I married C. G. Bradford at Evanston, Wyoming on the 8th day of October, 1935," and in
answer to interrogatory "E" lVIrs. Caffall answered that to
her best knowledge Mr. Bradford was living on the 20th
day of July, 1936 and died sometime in 1939.
That on the 8th day of February, 1955 at 10 :00 o'clock
A. M. before the I-Ionorable Clarence E. Baker the defendant's petition to vacate and set aside the decree was duly
heard, and testimony introduced. That the plaintiff testified (R. 5) as follows:
Let's take the next one, Interrogatory 'C' ·:
If you were not married to Mr. Bradford on July
20, 1936, when and where were you divorced from
Mr. Bradford?
"Q.
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"A. I appeared in the District Court of Sal~
Lake County approximately the last week in October,.
1935 with attorney Matthews for the purpose of;
securing an annulment, which annulment I though~
had been obtained.
"A. y es.
"Q.

court?
"A.

Did Mr. Matthews bring you down to:

y es.

"Q.

Did you testify?

"A.

No, I didn't testify.

"Q.

Did you file any legal proceedings?

"A. V{ell, it has been so long ago I rightl.,
can't remember. You "ill have to ask Mr. Matthews.
1\Ir. Matthews \Yas duly called as a witness and testified ( R. 22) that he had never taken Mrs. Caffall to court
and had never secured an annulment, and that he had
checked the records and found that there had never been
an annulment obtained. The court, at the conclusion of the
hearing, took the matter under advisement, and on the 5th
day of October, 1955 rendered his decision thereon, denying~
the defendant's petition to vacate and set aside the Jlecree
of divorce, from \Yhich judgn1ent the defendant appeals.
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I.
TliAT rrHE COURT CO~IMITTED ERROR IN
DEN\.. ING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION
TO V'A.CATE .4-\ND SET ASIDE THE DECREE
OF DI''\ 10RCE.
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ct c%!!:

ARGUMENT

weeamr:

tn~ ~;

!

mulmentl:

POINT I.
THAT THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION
TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE THE DECREE
OF DIVORCE.

The preponderance of the evidence establishes that at
he time of the marriage of the plaintiff Ruth Caffall to
he defendant Vern Caffall she was in fact married to C.
i. Bradford and had no legal capacity to marry the defen~~Irf·:lant Vern Caffall. The plaintiff, in her answer to defen~~~H-ant's Interrogatory "A", admitted (R. 15) that she mar'', '
· ~ied C. G. Bradford at Evanston, Wyoming on the 8th day
:~rr~of October, 1935. The plaintiff testified (R. 15) that she
~::1ppeared in the District Court for Salt Lake County apKnproximately the last week of October, 1935 with her attorljpney, 0. H. Matthews, for the purpose of obtaining an annulij[c~:ment (R. 21). The testimony of her attorney, 0. H. Mat,i,:thews, (R. 22) denies that he ever appeared in court with
~Mrs. Caffall and that he ever filed an annulment for her,
;:.:);and t~t he had searched the records of the Clerk's office
r9f Salt Lake County and found that an annulment had never
·been taken seems to clearly establish that Mrs. Caffall had
nJ:never obtained a divorce or annulment prior to her marriage to the defendant Vern Caffall. The plaintiff's answe·r
_.to the defendant's Interrogatory "E" (R. 15) admitted that
:, Mr. Bradford was alive at the time of her marriage to the
~~defendant Vern Caffall, and seems to remove all doubt
l~that Mrs. Caffall was in fact married to Mr. C. G. Bradford

~ ,,,~

1

1,-
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at the time she married Mr. Caffall, and had no legal capac.
ity to marry him.
The law is well settled that if the court does not have
jurisdiction of the subject matter, that any decree entered
is a nullity and is void and should be vacated and set aside
upon application. In 27 C. J. S., Sec. 169, P. 812, the law
is set forth as follows :
"A divorce decree granted by a court without
jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the person
is void and should be set aside irrespective of fraud."
The evidence in this case before the court clearly shows
that the parties were not legally married at the time the
divorce proceedings of Ruth Dolar Caffall vs. Vern Caffall,
defendant in this action, were commenced. The Utah
divorce statute (U. C. A. 193, 30-3-1) provides as follows:
"Proceedings in divorce should be commenced
and conducted in the manner prescribed by law for
proceedings in civil cases, except as hereinafter provided, and the court may decree a dissolution of the
marriage contract between the plaintiff and defendant in a case where the plaintiff shall have been an
actual and bona fide resident in this state and the
county where the action is entered for three, months
next prior to the commencement of the action, for
any of the following grounds; * * *."
It is obvious from a plain reading of the statute that the
jurisdiction of the court in divorce matters is limited to the
dissolution of marriages, and where the evidence shows
that there is no valid marriage contract then existing, the
court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter, and any
decree by the court would be void, ab i nitio.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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)\~~.

Regardless of the extent of its equity powers in other
matters, a court of equity cannot assume any powers in
1~:~~ divorce actions or proceedings other than those which are
~~: expressly conferred by statute (Towns vs. Towns, 176 N.
~~it W. 216), and since the Utah divorce statute confers jurisl~: diction only to dissolve marriages and conveys no further
jurisdiction, this court has no jurisdiction unless there is
in fact a valid existing marriage at the time the action is
I, ·~~ commenced. In 27 C. J. S., P. 628 the rule is stated as fol;~· lows:
"The general power to grant a divorce is statutory, and particular courts have such power and only
such power in this regard as is conveyed by statutory
or constitutional provisions. In view that a divorce
proceeding, insofar as it affects the status of the
parties, is an action in rem, it can be stated broadly
that in order that any court may obtain jurisdiction
of any action for divorce, such court must obtain
jurisdiction of the· res, that is, of the marriage
status."
'")1.

t

In the case of Anderson vs. Anderson, 44 N. E. 2nd
54, P. 57, the court said:
"The jurisdiction of a court hearing divorce
matters depends upon the grant of the statute and
not upon its general equity powers."
In Smith vs. Smith, 166 N. E. 85, the court said:
"Courts of equity have no inherent powers in
cases of divorce. The jurisdiction of courts of equity
to hear and determine divorce cases and all matters
related thereto is conferred entirely by statute.
vVhil~ s.uch courts may exercise their powers within
the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute, the jurisdiction depends upon the grant of the
statute and not upon general equity powers."
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It seems to clearly follow that if there is in fact no
marriage there would be no res or subject matter over
which the court would have jurisdiction, and any action
taken by the court would be without jurisdiction and void.
In the case at bar the great preponderance of evidence
shows that there was in fact no valid existing marriage
between the parties at the time the action for divorce was
commenced or at the time the divorce was entered, and for
that reason, the court having no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the decree was void from the beginning. (C. J. S.
27, P. 812.)
"A divorce decree granted by a court without
jurisdiction of the subject matter entered or of the
person, is void and should be set aside irrespective
of the question of fraud."
The rule is well stated in Nelson on Divorce and Annulment, Vol. 3, P. 175, Sec. 28.27:
"If the court granting a purported divorce
lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief, its decree is
beyond the court and unquestionably open to attack
by anyone at any time. But if it had jurisdiction of
the subject matter the court's decree is not open to
attack for error in its findings as to residence requirement, and the party "\vho sought the divorce
or the opposing party if he is guilty of collusion or
acquiescence in the proceedings is estopped to question such findings."
In Ho1oard vs. Howard, 26 N. E. (2nd), 421, the court
says:
"A decree entered \Vithout jurisdiction is void
and can be vacated at any time, and may be even
attacked collaterally.''
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Miller vs. Prout, 197 Pac. 1033, is a case of a void
judg1nent, the invalidity of which does not appear on the
face of the record, and was vacated upon motion and a showing by extrinsic evidence. The case of Choi ys. Turk, 152
Pac. 1000, an Oklahoma case holding that a void judgment
would be set aside and vacated at any time on a motion in
a direct proceeding. The case of Behymer vs. Schrader, 19
Pac. 2nd 829, is another case with the same holding, and
in this case the court said:
"It is conceded that the attack made on the
judgment quieting title is collateral and not direct.
The chief distinction between a collateral and a direct attack upon such a judgment is that in a
collateral attack the evidence shown may be raised
to show excess of jurisdiction is restricted to the
judgment role as defined by law at the time of the
rendition of the judgment, but whereby a resort to
such evidence the want of validity in the judgment
is demonstrated, the duty to declare it void is imperative in collateral as well as direct attack."
This case shows the distinction between a case in which
a void judgment is attacked in a direct attack and not in a
collateral attack. There are many cases holding that a
judgment cannot be attacked collaterally, but there are few
if any cases holding that a direct attack cannot be made by
motion in the proceedings in a divorce action where the
facts show that the decree is in fact void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter.
In the case of Hutton vs. Dodge, 198 Pac. 162, our
Supreme Court quoted with approval the following language
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from the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw, 2 Gray 61, Ma.
Dec. 454:
"But we think the point here is settled by authority, not specifically in regard to divorce but
generally as to the conclusive fact of a judgment
in a case arising afterwards in the same matter
between the same parties. We take the rule to be
that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties, the legal processes duly served, where
no appeal, writ of error, or review or other legal
process is commenced by the party who would void
the judgment in the mode or time prescribed by law
is conclusive upon the same parties in any other
proceeding in law or equity or before any other
judicial tribunal."
Our Supreme Court, after approving the foregoing
language, expressly limited this rule to those cases wherein
the court has jurisdiction of both the person and the subject
matter, and used the following language:
"Thus we see the application of the doctrine
contended for by the appellant is conditional upon
the fact that express jurisdiction has been obtained
both of the subject matter and of the person.
"It is unnecessary to review the cases in detail.
They are clearly distinguishable from the case at
bar. They do not in any manner atte11~pt to controve~rt the fundamental idea that where jurisdiction
has not been obtained there is no basis for the plea
res adjudica.ta. As stated by Chief Justice Shaw in
the excerpt hereinbefore quoted, a judgment becomes
res adjudicata only when the court has acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the parties."
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In the case of Lockw·ood vs. Lockwood, 168 P. 501, an
Arizona case, the court held that where there is a failure
to get jurisdiction of the defendant in a divorce action upon
a proper showing the court should set aside the judgment at
any time. And again, we say that the same rule would
apply to those cases where the court had no jurisdiction of
the subject matter.
In the case of In re Christensen Estate, 53 P. 1003, our
Supreme Court said :
"A decree of divorce granted without jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the person is absolutely void."
The same rule is expressed by the Supreme Court of
Iowa in the case of Radle vs. Radle, 214 N. W. 603, where
the court in a divorce action sustained a motion to set aside
the decree on the grounds there had been no proper service
of summons, and in setting aside the decree the court said:
"It is of course true that if the decree complained of is absolutely void for want of jurisdiction of the court, then it would be subject to either
a direct or collateral attack and by procedure quite
independent of the statute. If therefore we should
look upon defendant's motion either as a direct or
collateral attack upon a void decree, he is under no
less burden of proving facts which negative the
jurisdiction of the court."
In line with this case some jurisdictions have held that
where a direct attack is made upon the validity of a void
judgment the burden is upon the party raising the question
to assume the burden of proof of showing that the judg-
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ment or decree is in fact void for lack of jurisdiction. We
believe that the defendant, Vern Caffall, has sustained that
burden of proof in this case now before the court. This
Iowa case is in harmony with the decision of our own court
and follows the rule that the judgment rendered is. absolutely void if the court did not in fact have jurisdiction of
the person and the subject matter, but creates a presumption that the decree is valid and places the burden of proof
upon the party asserting a lack of jurisdiction of proving
lack of jurisdiction, but when the one raising the question
of jurisdiction has assumed that burden of proof as Mr.
Caffall has in this case, then the court should vacate and
set aside the decree.
In the case at bar the defendant, Vern Caffall, filed
a petition in the original divorce proceeding to vacate and
set aside the decree on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, and on the hearing the
evidence clearly established that at the time of the marriage of the plaintiff to defendant, plaintiff was in fact
married to another man, and was, of course, never legally
married to defendant, and plaintiff and defendant not being
legally married, this court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and the decree was absolutely void from
the beginning and can be attacked in a direct attack at any
time.
It may be conceded that some of the texts and cases
seem to hold that if the decree is valid on its face it cannot be vacated. In other words, before the decree may be
vacated the lack of jurisdiction must appear on the face
of the judgment roll and cannot be shown by extrinsic evi-
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dence. But an examination of these cases reveals that they
are cases wherein the attack on the judgment is a collateral
attack and not a direct attack as we have in the case at bar.
But, a direct attack on the judgment by a petition in the
original divorce proceedings to vacate and set aside the
judgment is a direct attack and the courts have generally
held as did our Supreme Court in the case of Hutton vs.
Dodge, that such a proceeding is a direct attack and that
on the hearing of the motion to vacate and set aside the
judgment any fact going to show the lack of jurisdiction of
the court to enter the judgment may be presented, and if
the facts show that the court had no jurisdiction of either
the person or the subject matter, the court should declare
the j udginent void.
The language of the court of Idaho in the case of
Bald~win vs. Anderson, 8 P. (2nd), 461, expresses the
more reasonable rule to be followed in cases involving this
problem:
"The power within proper limits to vacate its
judgments is inherent in all courts of record independent of statute (Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed.
Sec. 194, p. 375). While we have no statute expressly authorizing the vacation of a judgment on
motion, the inherent power of courts of record to
vacate their judgments void upon the face of the
judgment roll upon the motion of a party or on its
own motion at any time has been repeatedly recognized, by this court, and where the invalidity of a
void judgment does not appear on the face of the
judgment roll, it may be vacated upon motion made
within a reasonable time. Such motion is a direct
and not a collateral attack on the judgment, and any
facts going to show the invalidity of the judgment
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can be presented at the hearing of the motion. In
addition to jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, it is necessary to the validity of the
judgment that the court have jurisdiction of the
question which its judgment assumes to decide and
jurisdiction to render the judgment for the particular remedy or relief which the judgment undertakes
to grant.''
In the case at bar the court did not have jurisdiction
of the subject matter.
Even though this court should follow those few cases
In which the courts have held that before the court can
vacate and set aside the judgment the lack of jurisdiction
must appear on the face of the judgment roll, this court
could not do so in the case at bar. In the case of Thompson
vs. Cook, 127 P. (2nd) 909, the Supreme Court held that
the trial court has no power to set aside on motion a judgment or order not void on its face unless the motion is made
within a reasonable time from the date of the entry of the
judgment except where the party in whose favor an order
or judgment, valid on its face, runs, admits facts or fails
to dispute evidence showing its invalidity, then the trial
court must declare the judgment void. In the case at bar
the court, having permitted the introduction of evidence as
to the question of jurisdiction at the hearing upon defendant's petition to vacate the decree and the evidence now
before the court not being successfully disputed that there
was no valid existing marriage between the parties and
the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action at the time the divorce was granted, this court must
now vacate the decree as the California court did in the
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case of Thompson vs. Cook. This rule is also well stated in
the case of Huffman vs. Huffman, 86 P. 593, where the
court said:
"Where a void judgment is called to the attention of the court, it is incumbent upon that tribunal
to purge its own records of the nullity by cancelling
the entry thereof."
The case of Rynearson vs. Union County, 102 P. 785,
holds that if upon application, a void judgment is not set
aside, and the invalidity is attempted to be upheld, whereby
the court in refusing to discharge the duty thus devolving
upon it, exercises its judicial functions erroneously.
It seems to the writer that the clear duty of this court
is to set aside the decree of divorce in this case because the
evidence now before this court established the fact that the
plaintiff and defendant were not in fact married at the
time the divorce proceedings were had, and this court had
no jurisdiction of the subject matter and the decree is void,
and that this precise question was determined by our own
Supreme Court in the case of Hutton vs. Dodge.
This court should set aside a void judgment at any time
it is called to the attention of the court as was stated in the
case of JtVhite vs. Ladd, 680 P., 739, wherein the court said:
"This power is inherent with the court and will
be exercised even at its own suggestion for the preservation of its dignity and the protection of its officers and to arrest further actions which can serve
no lawful purpose."
SUMMARY
At the time the plaintiff Ruth Caffall married the defendant Vern Caffall she was then married to C. G. Brad-
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ford and had no legal capacity to marry the defendant Vern
Caffall. That the Utah divorce statute confers jurisdiction
only to dissolve marriages, and since there was no valid
marriage existing between the parties at the time the
divorce proceedings were had the court had no jurisdiction
of the subject matter.

CONCLUSIONS
That since there was no valid existing marriage between the parties at the time the plaintiff filed her action
for divorce, the court had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the decree is void ab i nitio; and the trial judge
committed error when it denied the defendant's petition to
vacate and set aside the divorce decree.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND R. BRADY,
Attorney for Appellant.

616 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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